China’s Presence in Central Asia: Will the “Red Dragon” Swallow Tajikistan?

Trade turnover between Tajikistan and China increased 2.5 times in the first quarter of this year. In recent years, alongside the growth in trade turnover, China has been actively increasing its presence in various sectors of Tajikistan’s economy.

In 2021, China ranked first in terms of investment in Tajikistan’s economy, investing $220 million. Tajikistan’s economic authorities reported that, following China, the next largest investors in the country’s economy in 2021 were Turkey with $25 million, Switzerland with $21 million, France with $19 million, Cyprus with $10 million, and the United Kingdom with $6 million.

Sputnik, citing Tajikistan’s Ministry of Finance, reported that Tajikistan’s external debt reached $3.256 billion by mid-2021. Among the countries and international organizations lending to Tajikistan, China, with $1.2 billion, is the largest creditor. These figures are from the first half of last year, and in 2021, the volume of foreign investment attracted to Tajikistan’s economy amounted to $700 million. Thus, the attraction of foreign loans continues, and China remains one of Tajikistan’s key partners in providing financial support for these investments.

Central Asia Has Become an Arena of Rivalry Between China and the United States

It is believed that in the first ten years after gaining independence, the Central Asian countries, despite being officially recognized by China, were not a priority in Beijing’s foreign policy. An analytical article on the “CABAR” website states that the shift in China’s economic policy towards Central Asia was driven by two factors. The first factor was the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent military presence of the United States and its Western allies (NATO) in Central Asia, including the establishment of military bases in Manas (Kyrgyzstan), Khanabad and Termez (Uzbekistan), and Dushanbe airport, as well as the presence of American and Western military advisors in these countries. The second factor was the series of color revolutions that occurred in the region, such as the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and the events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, in 2005. In these circumstances, Chinese authorities deemed it necessary to strengthen their presence in the region and ensure their political stability in Central Asia through economic and social support.

Since the early 2000s, China has been gradually counteracting the influence of the United States and the West. It seemed that from that time until now, this country was not subject to financial sanctions from the United States and the West regarding other countries. Several examples clearly illustrate this. First, after the events in Andijan in May 2005, when the United States and the West imposed sanctions on Uzbekistan, China provided political and economic support to this country. By economically supporting the countries of the Central Asian region, China also turned them into its allies in combating threats near its borders, expressing its support both openly and covertly. As noted by this site, this position of China was the reason it expressed support for the actions of Tajik authorities during the events in Khorog in July 2012.

China also, despite U.S. sanctions against Iran, did not comply with them and derived double benefits. It purchased Iranian oil at low prices and for non-monetary payments (in exchange for cheap Chinese goods) while gently curbing U.S. influence in the region. The 25-year contract between China and Iran was also signed amid U.S. and Western financial sanctions against Iran. China also continued to cooperate with North Korea despite international sanctions. Recently, amid the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, when the Kremlin faced the most severe sanctions in the history of the world, Beijing once again “opened its arms” to Moscow. And again, as before, it derives double benefits. It buys oil and fuel from Russia at lower prices than other countries, bypasses U.S. sanctions, and weakens the position of its Western rival.

Projects That China Implements in Tajikistan

Rashid Ghani Abdullah, a political analyst, in his article titled “Tajikistan and China: Strategic Partnership or Lack of Alternatives?” writes that at the beginning of Tajikistan’s independence, Russia could not provide significant financial assistance to the newly independent Tajikistan. Islamic countries and the countries of the Persian Gulf also viewed the new state as former communists and were in no hurry to engage in serious economic cooperation. The Tajik government also exercised caution in expanding relations with these countries. The country’s leadership, which came to power in November 1992 during the height of the civil war, saw no other option but to strengthen economic cooperation with China. Emomali Rahmon, as the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, made his first foreign visit to China in 1993, laying the foundation for further cooperation between Beijing and Dushanbe.

In a report by the “Lenta.ru” website in June 2021 titled “Beijing’s Trap. China Makes Major Investments in Tajikistan,” the topic of cooperation between Tajikistan and China was addressed. It states: China is ready to provide Tajikistan with loans, supply equipment and technology, and also cooperate in the military sphere. Tajikistan became one of the first countries in the region to join the military bloc of four countries—China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan—initiated by Beijing in 2016. And Tajikistan did not stop there, continuing to support China’s positions in UN votes.

According to "Lenta.ru," approximately 80% of Tajikistan's gold mines belong to China and are sold as debt repayment to China. China continues to inject money into Tajikistan's economy, leading to even greater dependency. Over the past 14 years, Tajikistan's debt to China has increased sixfold, which has allowed Beijing to gain significant stakes in many of the country's profitable mines. In June 2019, an agreement was signed between Tajikistan and the Chinese company "Kashi Xinyu Dadi Mining Investment Limited" for the development of the "Yak-Jilva" silver mine, one of the world's largest in terms of natural reserves. The details of this agreement are still not publicly available, and only rumors exist. Tajik authorities have exempted this Chinese enterprise from VAT, income tax, and import duties on equipment. According to the source, 106 people work at this mine, of whom 70 are Chinese citizens and 36 are Tajik nationals.

China has built numerous roads in Tajikistan and connected the North-South power line, but many experts believe that China is preparing this infrastructure for itself to ensure the future presence of Chinese companies and Chinatown-like settlements. "Lenta.ru" reports the presence of more than 400 Chinese companies in Tajikistan and notes that in exchange for constructing the "Dushanbe-2" heating plant, the Chinese have acquired the "Kumargi Bolo" and "Duoba" gold mines in the Ayni district of Sughd Province.

Doctor of Economics Haji Muhammad Umarov mentioned in an interview that the reason for the significant increase in Chinese investments in Tajikistan is that Chinese investors understand the "local rules" very well. Inside China, they oppose corruption, but in their surrounding countries, especially in Central and Southeast Asia, Chinese investors encourage corruption to generate greater revenues for China's treasury.

Additionally, sources suggest that China has been expanding its influence in Central Asia and Tajikistan through education and culture in recent years. Currently, around 5,000 Tajik students are studying at Chinese universities. Within Tajikistan, the number of schools teaching the Chinese language is increasing, and two Confucius Institutes are currently implementing China's "soft policy" in Tajikistan.

**Concerns Over the Increasing Presence of the Eastern Giant Neighbor**

In recent years, the growing closeness of China with the Central Asian states and the financial dependency of these countries on the eastern giant have raised concerns among experts, media, and even residents of the Central Asian region.

Given China's influence in the world, this issue raises even more concerns. China has a strategic plan to build the Silk Road with a budget of $40 billion, and its trade with Central Asian countries also amounts to about $40 billion. Meanwhile, China's influence in other regions of the world has deepened. For example, in 2021, China exported goods worth $250 billion to Africa, overshadowing the role of another great power, such as the United States ($65 billion). While the United States invests $9 billion annually in Africa, China invests only $2.5 billion. Reports indicate that China has seized important facilities in exchange for large loans given to African countries. For instance, Zambia was forced to hand over the international airport in its capital to China to pay off its debts. Kenya is on the verge of handing over the important port of Mombasa to China. In December 2017, the Asian country Sri Lanka was forced to transfer the Hambantota port to China in exchange for its debt. China even has a military base in Djibouti, despite earlier claims by most experts that China's policy was focused solely on economic influence without a military component. However, this theory turned out to be incorrect, and as China gains more power, it is also expanding its military presence.

In Central Asia and Afghanistan, Chinese military activities have also been observed. The Central Asian countries are, so to speak, right under China's nose. China has now made the Americas, Europe, Australia, Africa, and Asia dependent on its products. This has led to the creation of a saying: "Only the penguins in Antarctica are not yet aware of China's influence."

The "CABAR" platform claims that China's growing influence in Central Asia is causing concern among its strategic rivals and local residents. Some of this Sinophobia is generated by China's competitors, but there is also evidence that China does not act without self-interest. It economically encircles the countries of the region and sets up China towns. These concerns are particularly focused on the Central Asian countries bordering China, while the local populations of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have not yet expressed such worries.

According to the source, people in Tajikistan are concerned, and discussions often arise in the media about China's influence and the growing presence of Chinese people in the republic. In trade, infrastructure, roads, electricity, and agriculture, the number of Chinese citizens is increasing. The Chinese have acquired from hundreds to tens of thousands of hectares of land in Tajikistan's agricultural sector. They use large amounts of chemicals, rendering the land unusable in the future. For their commercial interests, the Chinese keep local authorities content with bribes. They reluctantly hire local workers, and due to the increasing number of Chinese, it has become difficult for local residents to find jobs, while rental prices are rising. The number of mixed marriages has increased, with Tajik women marrying Chinese men, allowing them to obtain Tajik citizenship.

Tajik political scientist Rashid Ghani Abdullov, in an article about China's influence in Central Asia and the excessive dependency of these countries, writes that when China closes its borders for a few days due to a holiday or other occasion and halts trade, the negative consequences are immediately felt in the form of fluctuations in the local currency's exchange rate. This high level of lack of alternatives or other options in China's trade relations with Central Asia, along with the dependence of social and economic stability on this eastern neighbor, makes the positions of the region's countries vulnerable and weak.

According to this expert, currently, there is no visible way out or solution to this vulnerability. The issue of the region's countries joining the Eurasian Economic Union is also not a solution to the problem, as the limited capacity of this union to compete with China has already been demonstrated. Considering Russia's experience, relying on the West is also not a solution to the problem, and in light of this reality, Central Asian countries, despite the lack of a real alternative, must pursue a multi-faceted policy and strengthen cooperation not only in the political but also in the economic sphere with countries such as Iran, Pakistan, the wealthy Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and other countries in the world to avoid falling into the trap of dependency on China.